rather than professional base. This suggests that the question of whether society at large holds a view regarding who should be treated under such circumstances is important. If so, can such views be ascertained and embodied in decision-making principles for use when such choices need to be made?
In order to test the hypothesis that 'society' would be prepared to choose under such circumstances, some questions on such choices were included in the recent Cardiff Health Survey (5, 6) . Among fifteen such scenarios three questions focused on choosing between two people alike in all respects other than their ages. The part of the questionnaire used for these questions is given in Table 1 random from the electoral register for Cardiff City were asked to make these choices. The resulting frequencies are given in Table 2 . For the first two choices, those that expressed an opinion opted for the younger in the ratio of 84:1 and 14:1 respectively. However, when choosing between the two-year-old and the eight-year-old, the choice was for the older by a ratio of 5:3.
As part of the validation procedure for the questionnaires, in the pilot stage of the study, a random sample of 54 drawn from the same base population was asked to complete the questionnaire and were then subsequendy interviewed on their responses, the interviews being taped. In summary the reasons given to favour the eight-year-old are to protect the investments that have already been made, and the In further exploring and analysing the arguments used to favour the older child we must recognise that while an eight-year-old was chosen in preference to a two-year-old there will be some older age than eight (as yet unspecified) at which the two-year-old will be chosen, in order to maintain a consistency with the other two age-related choices.
In the survey no one articulated the 'rights' of the younger child, but they seem straightforward. The younger child will be losing more of his/her life than the older and therefore loses more in this respect. The challenge, which is in part attempted later, is to decide which point marks the boundary between choosing the younger and choosing the older.
If vi) Further we may assume that when two individuals are alike in all respects including the same age then it should be impossible to choose between them. This is the situation in which we are indifferent to the choice made.
The consequences of these extra observations have been summarised, in terms of the implied solution to the problem, in Fig 1. Those parts of the solution boundary relating to the observations above have been labelled with the appropriate matching Roman numeral.
The solution has been primarily defined by these extra observations as indicated. While there is certain to be debate as to the exact location of particular points there seems to be a basis for achieving a consensus for most of the boundary. The difficult part of the boundary is that region marked (vii), because the only evidence we have of its location is one of its (imprecise) ends together with data concerning choice derived from the Cardiff Health Survey. The boundary between the two solutions is the point where the conflict between the potential years of life lost, the investments that have been made and the anguish of knowing what is happening pull in opposite directions. It can be argued that there comes a point in life where society ceases 'investing' in individuals. Suppose that this point is when education and vocational training has ceased and that it occurs at 23 years of age. Thus choosing between two people aged 23 and say 24, the 23-year-old would be chosen as he/she had the same investment, the same anguish, but more years to lose. On the other hand, when choosing two people aged 23 and, say 22, the 23-year-old might be chosen due to the extra investment that has been made; the anguish would be comparable and the extra year of life lost by the younger of less value than the extra year of investment in the older. To ensure that these age pairs are the correct side of the boundary, the boundary must leave the equal age line and move down and to the right. Eventually this part of the boundary joins up with that part due to (iii) above. It has been drawn as concave to the older group in order to reflect the extra years lost by the younger groups. The curve must be continuous but it is not self-evident that a consensus view would choose a 23-year-old in favour of say a 14-year-old, and the curve may therefore bend back upon itself.
Empirical research might eventually show that the boundary departs the equal age line moving down and to the left. The authors feel that this would be 
